Time Inconsistency and Free-Riding in a Monetary Union by V. V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe
VARADARAJAN V. CHARI
PATRICK J. KEHOE
Time Inconsistency and Free-Riding





be mitigated by imposing constraints on non-monetary policies. Without
a time inconsistency problem, the union has no free-rider problem; then
constraints on non-monetary policies are unnecessary and possibly harmful.
This theory is here detailed and applied to several non-monetary policies:
labor market policy, ﬁscal policy, and bank regulation.
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SINCE THE1990S, INTERESThasgrowninthedesignofmonetary
unions—groups of political units (countries or states or provinces) that have a great
dealofindependenceinsettingﬁscalandothernon-monetarypoliciesbutthatsharea
centralmonetaryauthority,anindependententitywhichsetsasinglemonetarypolicy
for all the members of the union. In practice, some monetary unions have worked
poorly while others have worked well. Argentina is an example of an unsuccessful
one; the United States, a successful one; and the jury is still out on the European
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Monetary Union. Why are some monetary unions successful and others not? Here,
we develop a theory that answers this question.
Thetimeinconsistencyprobleminmonetarypolicyisattheheartofourtheory.We
argue that under some circumstances, this monetary policy problem leads to a novel
type of free-rider problem in the setting of non-monetary policies by union members.
Free-riding union members pursue lax non-monetary policies that beneﬁt themselves
individually, but that induce the monetary authority to pursue policies that generate
high inﬂation for the whole union.
One way to eliminate both problems is to directly solve the time inconsistency
problem in monetary policy. As is well-known, in theory, at least, this problem can
be solved by imposing commitment or reputational mechanisms on the monetary
authority. When either type of mechanism is in place, there is no free-rider problem,





More interestingly, we show that solving a monetary union’s free-rider problem
helpsmitigateitstimeinconsistencyprobleminmonetarypolicy.Thefree-riderprob-
lemcanbesolvedbyimposingunionwideconstraintsonnon-monetarypolicies,such
as rules on labor market policies, debt constraints on ﬁscal policy, and regulation of
banks. When union members’ non-monetary policy options are limited, the monetary
authority is less likely to be induced to act in ways that increase inﬂation. The con-
straints thus do not necessarily eliminate the time inconsistency problem, but they do
at least reduce it.
We ﬁrst make these points in a general theoretical setup. Our model has govern-
ments that set non-monetary policies non-cooperatively, private agents that behave
competitively, and a benevolent monetary authority that chooses the inﬂation rate.
The monetary authority’s optimal inﬂation rate depends on the decisions of private
agents and on the individual governments’ non-monetary policies. Private agents
make their decisions anticipating the choice of the monetary authority. Governments
choose their non-monetary policies anticipating the choices of both private agents
and the monetary authority.
In our setup, the free-rider problem is quite different from that in the existing
literature. In the standard formulation of the free-rider problem, decision makers
are directly linked; the actions of each decision maker directly affect the payoffs of
others. Our setup has no such direct links. Here, the non-monetary policy of each
government affects the common inﬂation rate and thus indirectly affects the payoffs
of other governments. This indirect link does not, however, sufﬁce to generate a
free-rider problem. We use an envelope argument to prove that.
Here, the source of the free-rider problem is, rather, the behavior of forward-
looking private agents when the monetary authority cannot commit to a policy.
Without such commitment, a change in non-monetary policy by one of the union’s
member governments induces the private agents to predict a change in unionwide
inﬂation, and this predicted change induces them to change their decisions. BecauseVARADARAJAN V. CHARI AND PATRICK J. KEHOE : 1331
each government cares about the decisions of its own private agents, a change in
non-monetary policy by any member government affects the welfare of them all.
This indirect link results in a free-rider problem. With commitment by the monetary
authority,thereisnofreeriderproblemevenifthemodelhasforward-lookingprivate
agents.
To highlight the role of private agents in generating the free-rider problem, we
start by considering a monetary union without them, that is, with only governments
and a monetary authority. We show that in this environment, as long as the monetary
authority is benevolent, there is no free-rider problem.
After detailing the theory, with as well as without private agents, we consider
applications to three common types of non-monetary policies: labor market policy,
ﬁscal policy, and bank regulation.
We ﬁrst apply our theory to labor market policy. To do so, we modify the classic
model of time inconsistency in monetary policy (due to Kydland and Prescott 1977,
Barro and Gordon 1983). In our modiﬁcation of this classic model, governments of
countries in a monetary union determine the natural rate of unemployment by their
setting of labor market policies. We show that with this setup, the free-rider problem
leadsgovernmentstoadoptpoliciesthatresultinexcessivelyhighunemploymentand
inﬂation. Constraints on these labor market policies eliminate the free-rider problem
and help mitigate the time inconsistency problem.
Wethenapplyourtheorytoﬁscalpolicy.Weconsiderasimpledynamicmodelwith
many countries united in a monetary union. Each country’s ﬁscal authority ﬁnances
government spending by issuing nominal debt to its residents. After that, the union’s
monetary authority decides on the common inﬂation rate. The monetary authority
balances inﬂation’s beneﬁts against its costs. Higher inﬂation has beneﬁts because it
reduces the real value of nominal debt and thus reduces the amount of distortionary
taxes that must be raised by each country’s government in order to repay the debt.
Higher inﬂation also has costs because it distorts allocations and thus reduces output.
Inourmodel,asthedebtrises,thebeneﬁtsofinﬂationrisemorethanthecosts.Hence,
the larger the debt that the monetary authority inherits, the higher it sets the inﬂation
rate.
In deciding on its level of government spending, each country’s ﬁscal authority
balances the gains from government spending against the costs of future distortions,
includingtheinducedcostsofhigherinﬂationonitsownoutput—ignoringinﬂation’s
costsontheoutputofothercountries.Thus,relativetoacooperativebenchmark,each
ﬁscal authority issues too much debt, which leads the monetary authority to create
too much inﬂation, which in turn leads to an inefﬁciently low level of output for all
countries in the union.
Inprinciple,ifthemonetaryauthoritycansomehoweffectivelycommittoitspolicy,
then ﬁscal authorities have no incentive to issue too much debt, and the union has no
free-rider problem. In practice, though, such commitment is often not available, and
monetary unions have typically chosen to attack the free-rider problem directly. One
way of doing so is to impose constraints on the amount of debt that governments of
union members can issue. In our example, appropriately chosen constraints solve the
free-rider problem.1332 : MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING
Finally, we apply our theory to bank regulation. We develop a simple dynamic
banking model with many countries united in a monetary union. Each country’s
government regulates the riskiness of its banks’ portfolios. When banks cannot fully
pay off depositors, the monetary authority prints money to pay the residual amount,
thus increasing inﬂation. Each country’s government thus balances the costs of regu-
lationintendedtoreducebankriskinessagainsttheinducedcostsofinﬂationresulting
from bank bailouts. In doing so, each government ignores the induced inﬂation costs
on other countries in the union. These forces also generate a free-rider problem in
which,comparedwithefﬁcientlevels,regulationofbanksislax,bankbailoutsaretoo
frequent, and the rate of inﬂation is excessive. If no mechanism is available to solve
the time inconsistency problem directly, then the free-rider problem in this model can
be mitigated with mutually agreed upon bank regulation.
Our general analysis and the three applications suggest an answer to our original
question:whyaresomemonetaryunionssuccessfulandothersnot?Amonetaryunion
is likely to fail when it has a time inconsistency problem in monetary policy and no
effective constraints on the non-monetary policies of its members.
Consider some examples of actual monetary unions. Argentina has experienced
high and volatile inﬂation rates. Jones, Sanguinetti, and Tommasi (2000), Cooper
and Kempf (2001a, 2001b), Tommasi, Saiegh, and Sanguinetti (2001), and Nicolini
et al. (2002) have argued that the non-monetary policies have not been effectively
constrained by the central government and that the central bank has routinely bailed
out the provincial governments. Argentina seems to be an example of a monetary
union which has a serious time inconsistency problem with its monetary policy and
which is unable to constrain the non-monetary policies of its provinces. In this sense,
thepoorperformanceofthemonetaryunioninArgentinaisconsistentwithourtheory.
The United States has experienced much lower and less volatile inﬂation rates
than many other monetary unions. The independence of the Federal Reserve System
apparently reduces the time inconsistency problem in monetary policy and thereby
insulates the monetary authority from pressures of state governments. In this sense,
the good performance of the monetary union in the United States is also consistent
with our theory.
Our theory suggests that the success of the European Monetary Union is not yet
assured. The charter of the European Central Bank was explicitly designed to make it
independent in order to help it overcome time inconsistency problems. If the Central
Bank is able to overcome these problems, the European Monetary Union will be
successful. Even if the Central Bank is not able to overcome these problems, the
Union may still be successful if it enforces the constraints on non-monetary policies
in the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact. The worrisome scenario
is that the Central Bank will not be able to resist pressures to inﬂate and the Union
will be unwilling to enforce its constraints on non-monetary policies.
In this context, it is worth noting that our theory predicts that when constraints that
enforcecooperativeoutcomesareagreedtobygovernmentsexante,eachgovernment
has a strong incentive to violate these constraints ex post. In practice, the European
Monetary Union has experienced signiﬁcant difﬁculty in enforcing constraints on theVARADARAJAN V. CHARI AND PATRICK J. KEHOE : 1333
ﬁscal policies of its member countries. The observation that some member countries
desire to violate the terms of the treaty does not, by itself, imply that the treaty was
poorly designed. This desire is exactly what our theory predicts would occur with a
well-designed treaty.
The behavior of other monetary unions is consistent with our theory as well. Von
Hagen and Eichengreen (1996) ﬁnd that 37 of the 49 countries they study impose
restrictions on the ﬁscal policies of their subcentral governments. Such restrictions
are consistent with a concern by central governments that they have not successfully
solved the time inconsistency problem in monetary policy.
Our work here generalizes and expands the analysis of our earlier work, Chari and
Kehoe(2007).Here,welayoutageneralframeworkforanalyzingfree-riderproblems
in monetary unions and apply it to three types of non-monetary policies. Our second
applied example here is related to the analysis in the earlier work. There we assume
that the governments borrow from lenders who live outside the monetary union in
ordertosmoothconsumptionovertime.Theunion’smonetaryauthorityusesinﬂation
as a way to levy a tax on the nominal debt holdings of these outside lenders. Here,
we assume instead that governments ﬁnance their spending by borrowing from their
own residents and repay the debt with distorting taxes. The monetary authority uses
inﬂation here as a way to reduce the real value of that debt and, hence, the required
tax distortions.
Our work here is also related to a literature on ﬁscal policy in monetary unions,
including the work of Giovannini and Spaventa (1991), Sibert (1992), Dixit and
Lambertini (2001), Uhlig (2002), and especially Beetsma and Uhlig (1999) and
Cooper and Kempf (2001a, 2001b, 2004). Beetsma and Uhlig, however, focus on
a monetary union’s ability to discipline political economy problems among its union
members, problems our monetary union does not have. Here, the free-rider problem
arises solely because of a time inconsistency problem. Cooper and Kempf, mean-
while, do focus on a free-rider problem, but not one like ours, that arises from time
inconsistency.Indeed,CooperandKempfemphasizethattheirfree-riderproblemdis-
appears when the union’s monetary policy is to maximize the welfare of the residents
of the union members.
The gains from setting ﬁscal policy cooperatively across countries have been dis-
cussed extensively and are well understood. Such cooperation has been shown to be
desirable if countries’ﬁ scal policies affect world prices and real interest rates (Chari
and Kehoe 1990, Canzoneri and Diba 1991). That kind of cooperation, however, is
not especially related to countries being in a monetary union. We thus here abstract
from the issues it raises by assuming that the policies of the countries joined in a
monetary union do not affect world prices and real interest rates.
1. THEORY
1.1 Without Private Agents
One of our principal contributions is to highlight the subtle source of free-rider
problems in environments with benevolent governments and a benevolent monetary1334 : MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING
authority: the behavior of forward-looking private agents. In order to set the stage for
ouranalysis,webeginwithasimplesetupwithoutprivateagents.Inthisenvironment,
atﬁrstglance,thereappearstobeafree-riderproblem,butcloserexaminationreveals
that there is none.
ConsideraworldeconomywithN countriesindexedi =1,..., N unitedinamon-
etary union, with one monetary authority that chooses unionwide monetary policy.
The government of country i chooses a non-monetary policy τ i, and the monetary
authority of the union chooses a common inﬂation rate for the union, denoted π. The
payoff (or welfare) from these choices to the government of country i is
V(τi,π). (1)
Consider ﬁrst an environment in which inﬂation π is some arbitrary function of
non-monetary policies: π(¯ τ), where ¯ τ = (τ1,...,τN). If governments choose their
non-monetarypoliciessimultaneouslyandnon-cooperatively,thentheﬁrst-ordercon-





Here and throughout, Vτ and Vπ denote the derivatives of V(τ i, π). (This is our
standard notation for derivatives.) Here, and throughout, we also consider coopera-
tive equilibria in which the non-monetary policies are chosen to maximize the sum
of all government payoffs (or all the countries’ welfare). We view these coopera-
tive equilibria as benchmarks for welfare that we use to judge the efﬁciency of the
non-cooperative equilibria, rather than as a description of how governments make
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The ﬁrst-order conditions (2) and (3) look just like those we would see in classic free-
rider problems. An example is the sharing-the-bill problem, in which N individuals
dine at a restaurant, each orders τ i, and they share the bill equally, so that π(¯ τ) =  N
i=1 τi/N. Clearly, in this situation, each individual free-rides off the other diners
because, at the margin, each individual enjoys all the beneﬁts of extra food but pays
only 1/Nth of the cost.
Thisresultmightseemtosuggestthatfree-ridingproblemsariseinmonetaryunions
from the same sources as in classic problems. Closer examination reveals, however,
thatthereisnofree-ridingintheenvironmentdescribedabove,aslongasthemonetary
authority is benevolent.
To see this, assume that the monetary authority is benevolent in that it maximizes
the sum of the payoffs to the governments
 N
i=1 V(τi,π). Suppose that the monetary





Vπ(τi,π) = 0. (4)
In a symmetric equilibrium, equation (4) implies that Vπ = 0. Using this result, we
see that here there is no free-rider problem because the ﬁrst-order conditions (2) and
(3) coincide. Obviously, this result does not depend on the timing of actions.
Thus, in this environment, with a benevolent monetary authority, a monetary union
has no free-riding problem. In practice, of course, monetary unions are plagued with
such problems. Their problems arise from a source that is not captured in the simple
environment just described—from the behavior of private agents, from which we
have abstracted. As we shall see, adding private agents to the environment adds a
time inconsistency problem in monetary policy that leads to a free-rider problem in
non-monetary policy.
1.2 With Private Agents
We now introduce private agents into the monetary union setup just described.
We then make explicit the logic by which a time inconsistency problem in monetary
policy leads to a free-rider problem in non-monetary policy.
Consider extending the setup with just a union of governments and a monetary
authority to include in each country a continuum of private agents indexed j ∈ [0, 1],
eachofwhomchoosesanaction zij. Let xi =
 
zijdjdenotetheaggregatechoiceof
actions by private agents in country i. In this extension, the payoffs to private agents
from these choices are
V(τi,zij,xi,π), (5)
where, as before, τ i denotes non-monetary policy by the government of country i and
π denotes the common inﬂation rate.
Thepayofftothegovernmentofanindividualcountryiistheintegralofthepayoffs
to the private agents in that country,
 
V(τi,zij,xi,π) dj, (6)
whereas the payoff to the union’s monetary authority is the sum of the payoffs to all





Notice that we have assumed that the non-monetary policies of individual gov-
ernments do not directly affect the payoffs to other governments; thus, the only1336 : MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING
way governments in this union interact is through the effect of their actions on the
common inﬂation rate. We make this assumption in order to abstract from standard
non-monetary policy linkages across countries, like tariffs and taxes. Such linkages
havebeenanalyzedextensivelyintheliteratureandhavenoobviousbearingonissues
concerning a monetary union (see, e.g., the work of Chari and Kehoe 1990).
Typically, a time inconsistency problem in monetary policy arises when the mon-
etary authority cannot effectively commit to an inﬂation policy. We will show that
without effective commitment in a monetary union, the union has a free-rider prob-
lem, which leads non-cooperative outcomes to differ from cooperative outcomes. We
show that the union has no such problem when the monetary authority can commit.
We formalize the lack of commitment that drives the time inconsistency problem
in a monetary union with a no commitment game that has the following timing. First
the governments choose τ i, then private agents choose zij, and ﬁnally the monetary
authority chooses π. We focus on an equilibrium in which all private agents within a
country choose the same actions, so that zij = xi for all i and j.
A non-cooperative equilibrium of this game is given by non-monetary policies
¯ τ = (τ1,...,τN),privateagentdecisionrules xi(¯ τ)thatdependonthosepolicies,and
a monetary policy function π(¯ τ,¯ x) that depends on both the non-monetary policies ¯ τ
and the private agents’ decisions ¯ x = (x1,...,xN) such that (i) for all ¯ τ,¯ x, the policy
π(τ, ¯ x) maximizes the monetary authority’s payoff; (ii) for each private agent ij, for
all ¯ τ, xi(¯ τ) solves
max
zij
V(τi,zij,xi(¯ τ),π(¯ τ,¯ x(¯ τ))), (8)
where ¯ x(¯ τ) = (x1(¯ τ),...,xN(¯ τ));(iii)foreachgovernmenti,giventhenon-monetary
policies of the other governments i , the private agents’ decision rules xi, and the
monetaryauthority’spolicyruleπ,thepolicyτi maximizesthepayofftogovernment
i.
A cooperative equilibrium of this game is deﬁned similarly, with (iii) replaced by
this: (iii ) given the private agents’ decision rules xi and the monetary authority’s
policy rule π, the vector ¯ τ maximizes the sum of the payoffs to the governments.
(Notice that conditions (i), (iii), and (iii ) require that the relevant policies be best
responses, whereas condition (ii) has a ﬁxed-point problem built into it.)
Throughout, we focus on symmetric equilibria, in which in addition to all private
agents within a country choosing the same decision (zij = xi all i, j), all governments
in the union choose the same policy (τi = τj all i, j). We characterize the equilibria by
working backward. Given non-monetary policies ¯ τ and private agent decisions ¯ x, the
monetaryauthoritychoosesπ tomaximizeunionwelfare(7).Theresultingmonetary
policy function π(¯ τ,¯ x) satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order condition
N  
i=1
Vπ(τi,xi,xi,π) = 0, (9)
which in a symmetric equilibrium is simply Vπ = 0.VARADARAJAN V. CHARI AND PATRICK J. KEHOE : 1337
Each private agent maximizes (5), taking as given the non-monetary policies ¯ τ,
other private agents’ decisions ¯ x, and the monetary policy function π(¯ τ,¯ x). The
resulting best response function Xi(τi,xi,π(¯ τ,¯ x)) satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order condition
Vz(τi,zij,xi,π) = 0. (10)
Let ¯ x(¯ τ) = (x1(¯ τ),...,xN(¯ τ)) denote the ﬁxed point of the best response function,
that is,
xi(¯ τ) = Xi (τi,xi(¯ τ),π(¯ τ,¯ x(¯ τ))) for all i. (11)
In a non-cooperative equilibrium, the government of country i maximizes
V(τi,xi(¯ τ), xi(¯ τ),π(¯ τ)). Let  (¯ τ) = π(¯ τ,¯ x(¯ τ)) denote the monetary policy func-
tionπ(¯ τ,¯ x)evaluatedattheprivateagentdecisionrules ¯ x(¯ τ).Then,thegovernment’s
ﬁrst-order condition is







where ∂ /∂τi = ∂π/∂τi +
 N
j=1(∂π/∂x j)(∂x j/∂τi). Notice that ∂ /∂τi captures
both the direct effects of changes in non-monetary policy τi on inﬂation and the
indirect effects through changes in private agents’ decisions.
In a cooperative equilibrium, the governments jointly choose τ to maximize
N  
i=1
V (τi,xi(¯ τ),xi(¯ τ), (¯ τ)).
Taking the ﬁrst-order conditions and then imposing symmetry gives














We can use these conditions to show the following:
PROPOSITION 1 (Free-riding without commitment): Suppose that in a monetary union,
there is a unique cooperative equilibrium with Vx  = 0 and ∂xj/∂τi  = 0 for i  = j.
Then, the monetary union has a free-riding problem, in the sense that the non-
cooperative and cooperative policies without commitment differ, and the cooperative
equilibriumhasstrictlyhigherwelfarethanthenon-cooperativeequilibrium.Ifeither
Vx = 0 or ∂xj/∂τi = 0 in the cooperative equilibrium, then the monetary union has
no free-riding problem, in the sense that the two equilibria coincide.1338 : MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING
PROOF. Substituting the ﬁrst-order conditions for the monetary authority and the

















Comparing equations (14) and (15), we see that the policies in the two equilibria
are different if and only if both Vx  = 0 and ∂x j/∂τi  = 0 in the cooperative equi-
librium. As the governments in a cooperative equilibrium could feasibly choose the
non-cooperative policies, the uniqueness of the cooperative equilibrium implies that
welfare is strictly higher in the cooperative equilibrium whenever the two equilibria
differ. 





1 − X jx
, (16)
where Xjx is the derivative of the ﬁxed point of the best response function in equation
(11) with respect to xj. Notice that if the decisions of private agents do not depend on
their predictions of inﬂation, so that Xjπ = 0, or if the inﬂation rate does not depend
on the non-monetary policies, so that ∂ /∂τj = 0, then ∂xj/∂τi = 0, and there is no
free-rider problem.
At a superﬁcial level, the free-rider problem seems to arise solely because inﬂation
confers a common cost on all the countries in the union, whereas an individual coun-
try’s government cares only about the effect of inﬂation on its own payoffs. The true
source of the free-rider problem is, however, subtler. For example, suppose that Vx =
0—say, because there are no general equilibrium effects from private agents. Then,
the two equilibria coincide even though individual governments care only about the
effects of inﬂation on their own countries. In this example, with Vx = 0, the two
equilibria coincide because of an envelope argument. In the cooperative equilibrium,
the monetary authority chooses inﬂation to balance the costs and beneﬁts, so that at
the margin, an incremental change in inﬂation has no effect on union welfare. Start-
ing at this outcome, a non-cooperative government realizes that, at the margin, the
induced effect of its policies on welfare through their effect on inﬂation is zero. In
both the cooperative and non-cooperative equilibria, therefore, a government’s non-
monetary policies at the margin affect only that government’s welfare. Hence, there
is no free-rider problem.
When Vx  = 0 and ∂x j/∂τi  = 0, however, there is a free-rider problem. Starting
at the cooperative outcome, we know that if the government of country i changes its
non-monetarypolicies,thenthemonetaryauthorityrespondsbychangingtheinﬂationVARADARAJAN V. CHARI AND PATRICK J. KEHOE : 1339
rate.Atthemargin,ifweneglecttheinducedeffectsonprivateagentdecisionsx,then
this change has no effect on welfare. The key is, however, that the induced change
in the inﬂation rate does induce changes in private agent decisions x. This is the
channel that leads to the free-rider problem. A change in the non-monetary policy τi
makes the private agents in all the countries predict a change in inﬂation, and this
predicted change makes them change their actions. (Mechanically, we can see this
fromequation(16),whichgivesthechangeinprivateagentdecisionsincountryjdue
to changes in non-monetary policy in country i. For this change to be non-zero, we
need ∂ /∂τi  = 0 and Xjπ  = 0.) When Vx  = 0, the change in private agent decisions
due to a predicted change in inﬂation implies that a change in non-monetary policy in
countryiinducesachangeinwelfareincountryjandthusleadstoafree-riderproblem.
Later we will illustrate the detailed economic channels of the free-rider problem in
our application of this theory to three speciﬁc types of non-monetary policies.
We now show that if the monetary union has no time inconsistency problem, then
it has no free-rider problem either. The union has no time inconsistency problem
when its monetary authority has some commitment or reputational mechanism. To
demonstrate that here, for simplicity, we just assume that the monetary authority can
commit to its policies. A similar analysis would apply to the reputational equilibria
that support commitment in a repeated game version of the model.
The timing in the commitment game is as follows. First the monetary authority
chooses π, then governments choose τi, and ﬁnally private agents choose xij .
A non-cooperative equilibrium of this game is given by a monetary policy π,
government non-monetary policy functions τi(π), and private agent decision rules
xi(π, ¯ τ), such that (i) for each private agent ij, and for all π and ¯ τ, xi(π, ¯ τ) solves
max
zij
V(τi,zij,xi(π, ¯ τ),π); (17)
(ii) for each government i, for all π, given the non-monetary policies of the other
governments τi (π) and the private agent decision rules xi(π, ¯ τ), the non-monetary
policy τi(π) maximizes the payoff to government i; and (iii) given the government
non-monetarypolicyfunctionsτi andtheprivateagentdecisionrulesxi,themonetary
policy π maximizes the monetary authority’s payoff, or the union’s overall welfare.
A cooperative equilibrium of the commitment game is deﬁned similarly, but with
(ii) replaced by this: (ii ) for all π, given the private agent decision rules xi(π, ¯ τ), the
non-monetary policy τi(π) maximizes the sum of the payoffs to the governments.
We then have the following:
PROPOSITION 2 (No free-riding with commitment): In a monetary union with com-
mitment, the non-cooperative and cooperative policies coincide, and welfare in the
resulting equilibria is the same. Thus, with commitment, the union has no free-riding
problem.
PROOF. Consider private agent optimality. From equation (17), we know that the
ﬁrst-order condition for private agents in both equilibria is Vz = 0 and that xi(π, ¯ τ)1340 : MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING




In the non-cooperative equilibrium, the governments choose τi to maximize
V (τi,xi(π, ¯ τ),xi(π, ¯ τ),π).






Acting cooperatively, the governments choose τi to maximize
N  
i=1
V (τi,xi(π, ¯ τ),xi(π, ¯ τ),π).
Using V z = 0 and equation (18), we see that the ﬁrst-order condition for this problem
reduces to equation (19). Clearly, the non-cooperative and cooperative equilibria
coincide. Thus, with commitment, there is no free-rider problem. 
The intuition for the differing results in the environments with and without com-
mitment is as follows. In both environments, a government in a given country i does
not care directly about the non-monetary policies or the private agent choices in
any other country j. Without commitment, however, non-monetary policies in other
countries induce changes in the common inﬂation rate and thus changes in private
agent choices in country i. This linkage leads non-monetary policies in country i to
dependonnon-monetarypoliciesincountryj.Thissubtlelinkageleadstoafree-rider
problem. With commitment, the links among governments in different countries are
broken, and there is no free-rider problem.
Note that in our application to bank regulation, the monetary authority has essen-
tiallyazero-onedecisiononwhethertobailoutbanksthatareindangerofinsolvency.
This feature implies that, even though the monetary authority is maximizing, it does
not set Vπ equal to zero. Inspecting equations (12) and (13), we see that if Vπ∂ /∂τi
is not equal to zero, then an analog of Proposition 1 typically applies. Proposition 2
holds as stated.
2. APPLICATIONS
Now we apply this general theory to some common examples of non-monetary
policies and show that in a monetary union, lack of commitment in monetary policy
leads to free-riding in non-monetary policy. We also show that in such a situation,
constraints on non-monetary policies are desirable.VARADARAJAN V. CHARI AND PATRICK J. KEHOE : 1341
2.1 Labor Market Policy
First we apply our theory to a type of non-monetary policy that governments of
members of a monetary union control: labor market policy. For this application, we
use the classic model of time inconsistency in monetary policy due to Kydland and
Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983), in which ex post inﬂation reduces un-
employment. We modify this model to allow governments in a monetary union to set
labor market policies that determine the natural rate of unemployment in their own
countries. We show that without commitment, the free-rider problem leads govern-
ments to adopt policies that result in higher unemployment and inﬂation than would
occur in an efﬁcient allocation. We also show that the constraints imposed on labor
marketpolicieseliminatethefree-riderproblemandhelpmitigatebutdonoteliminate
the time inconsistency problem.
Consider the following modiﬁed version of Kydland and Prescott’s (1977) and
Barro and Gordon’s (1983) model. In this example, the natural rate of unemployment
in country i, ¯ u(τi), is affected by labor market policies in that country, denoted by τi.
For simplicity, let ¯ u(τi) = ¯ u − τi. The realized unemployment rate ui is determined
by the natural unemployment rate and the log of the real wage xi − π, which is the
difference between the log of the nominal wage and the log of the price level. As
initial prices are given, π is both the price level and the inﬂation rate. Speciﬁcally,
ui = xi − π + ¯ u(τi). (20)
In this example, each private agent chooses a wage zij, and the wage in country i
is given by xi =
 

















real wage for the private agents, the second and the third terms reﬂect concerns over
aggregate unemployment and inﬂation, and the last term captures the cost of altering
labor market policies that affect the natural rate of unemployment. Substituting for




(zij − π)2 −
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The payoff to government i is
 
V(τi,zij,xi,π)di, and the payoff to the union’s
monetary authority is the sum of the governments’ payoffs. These payoff functions
ensure that the private agents choose their wages to be the expected value of inﬂation
and that the monetary authority cares about the average rate of unemployment. (To
see why this assumption matters, see the work of Chari, Kehoe, and Prescott 1989.)
In much of the literature, the payoffs to the private agents are given (implicitly) by
the ﬁrst term on the right side of equation (22) and the payoffs to the monetary
authority, by the second and third terms. We choose to combine these terms so that
the governments and the monetary authority are benevolent.1342 : MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING
Equilibriaofthenocommitmentandcommitmentgamesinthisexamplearedeﬁned
exactly as in the theory section above. To show that the no commitment game has
a free-rider problem, we need show only that Vx  = 0 and ∂xi(¯ τ)/∂τj  = 0i nt h e
cooperative equilibrium. To do so, we ﬁrst use the monetary authority’s ﬁrst-order
condition to derive
π(¯ τ,¯ x) =
(1 + a)
 
xi + Na¯ u − a
 
τi
N(1 + a + b)
. (23)
Next we note that the private agent’s ﬁrst-order condition yields xi = π. Clearly, xi
is the same for all i, and we denote it by x. Then, x(¯ τ) solves the ﬁxed-point problem











Clearly, ∂xi(¯ τ)/∂τj =− a/bN  = 0 as long as a  = 0. To calculate the value of Vx,w e
need to solve for the cooperative equilibrium policies. It is straightforward to use the
monetary authority’s ﬁrst-order condition to show that the cooperative equilibrium
(C) labor market policies are given by τC = [a + (a2/b)¯ u]/[a + (a2/b) + c]. Using
equations (23) and (24), we obtain
Vx =
ac¯ u
a + (a2/b) + c
. (25)
If ac¯ u  = 0, we have that Vx  = 0. From Proposition 1, the following proposition is
immediate:
PROPOSITION3(Free-ridinginlabormarketpolicieswithoutcommitment):Inthegame
with no commitment, the monetary union has a free-rider problem, in the sense that
the non-cooperative and cooperative equilibria differ if ac¯ u  = 0.I fa c¯ u = 0, then
the union has no free-rider problem, in the sense that the two equilibria coincide.
Ifac¯ u = 0,thenthemonetaryunionhasnotimeinconsistencyprobleminmonetary
policy. This condition is related to similar conditions in the literature that follows
Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983). In that literature, ¯ u is
a constant, and there is only one country. A standard result in the literature is that
there is no time inconsistency problem if a = 0o ri f¯ u = 0, that is, if the monetary
authority does not have an incentive to reduce unemployment below the natural rate.
In our model, in which the natural rate can be affected by labor market policies, if
c = 0, then each government would simply set its policies so that the natural rate is
zero, and there would be no time inconsistency problem in monetary policy. Thus,
Proposition 3 essentially says that whenever there is a time inconsistency problem in
monetary policy, there is a free-rider problem in labor market policy.VARADARAJAN V. CHARI AND PATRICK J. KEHOE : 1343
It is easy to show that the equilibrium inﬂation rate under non-cooperation (N)i s
π N =
ac¯ u/b
a + (a2/bN) + c
and the equilibrium inﬂation rate under cooperation (C)i s
πC =
ac¯ u/b
a + (a2/b) + c
.
Clearly, the non-cooperative rate of inﬂation π N is greater than the corresponding
cooperativerateπC.Noticethatthenon-cooperativeinﬂationraterisesmonotonically
with the number of countries. In this sense, the free-rider problem gets worse as the
number of countries gets larger.
The free-rider problem can be eliminated by imposing constraints on the labor
market policies of the union’s member governments. The following corollary is im-
mediate.
COROLLARY TO PROPOSITION 3 (Labor market policy constraints and the free-rider
problem): In a monetary union without commitment, if each government is required
to set its labor market policy τi ≥ τC, then the union has no free-rider problem, in the
sense that the non-cooperative equilibrium attains the same levels as the cooperative
equilibrium.
Another way to interpret this corollary is as follows. Consider the problem of
designing the constraints on labor market policy in the symmetric non-cooperative
equilibrium in order to reach the highest attainable level of welfare. Inspection of the
cooperative problem makes clear that the highest attainable level of welfare is the
level in the cooperative equilibrium. In the non-cooperative equilibrium, this level of
welfare can be reached by setting the constraint τi ≥ τC.
Clearly,Proposition2appliestothisapplicationofourtheorytolabormarketpolicy,
and thus with commitment, there is no free-rider problem. Under commitment, the
cooperative rate of inﬂation is zero.
Notice that the constraints on labor market policy that eliminate the free-rider
problem in labor market policy also help mitigate the time inconsistency problem in
monetary policy because they lower inﬂation from π N to πC. They do not, however,
eliminate the time inconsistency problem: πC is still positive and thus higher than the
cooperative rate of inﬂation with commitment, which is zero.
Notethatthetimeinconsistencyproblemarisesevenifthemonetaryunionconsists
of a single country. As is well known, welfare is often lower without commitment in
monetary policy than with such commitment. The labor market constraints discussed
here obviously cannot solve the time inconsistency problem. All these constraints do
is help solve the free-rider problem by reproducing the outcomes that would occur
if the monetary union consisted of a single country. In this sense, even though the
free-rider problem arises because there is a time inconsistency problem, solving the
free-rider problem does not eliminate the time inconsistency problem.1344 : MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING
2.2 Fiscal Policy
Now we apply our theory to a second type of non-monetary policy: ﬁscal policy.
We assume here that each of the many governments in the monetary union issues
nominal debt to their residents in order to spend and smooth consumption over time.
Theunion’ssinglemonetaryauthoritychoosesacommoninﬂationrate.Thisinﬂation
reduces the real return on debt and effectively serves as a kind of partial default on it.
We show that when the monetary authority cannot effectively commit to its monetary
policy,theunionhasafree-riderproblem:governmentsissuetoomuchdebt,inﬂation
is too high, and output is too low relative to the cooperative levels. This free-rider
problemcanbesolvedbyimposingconstraintsontheamountofdebtthatgovernments
can issue. Such constraints lead to the cooperative levels of inﬂation and output.
We also show that if the monetary authority can commit to its policies, constraints
on ﬁscal policy are unnecessary and possibly harmful. From this perspective, critics
of these constraints, such as Buiter, Corsetti, and Roubini (1993), must be implicitly
assuming that the monetary authority can overcome its time inconsistency problem.
Consideratwo-periodmodelwithN identicalcountriesindexedi=1,...,N united
in a monetary union. The preferences of consumer j in country i are given by
U(c0ij) + V(gi) + βU(c1ij),
where c0ij and c1ij denote private consumption in the two periods; gi is government
consumption in period 0; U(ctij) for t = 0, 1 is the utility from private consumption;
β is the discount factor; and V(gi) is the utility from government consumption. We
normalize the price level in period 0 to be 1 and let π denote the unionwide gross
inﬂation rate between periods 0 and 1. We model monetary policy as the choice of
the price level that produces each period’si n ﬂation rate π.
In each country i, output in period 0 is a constant ω, while output in period 1 is
y(π, T i), where T i denotes real tax revenues in period 1. We assume that y(π, T i)
is decreasing in both π and T; both inﬂation and taxes distort decisions and therefore
reduce output. We assume that consumers have access to a linear savings technology
withexogenousgrossreturn1+r.Thisassumptionensuresthattherealinterestrates
are unaffected by policy.
Consider next the budget constraints of the governments and the consumers. For
simplicity, assume that the government consumption gi is ﬁnanced entirely by debt
issued to country i consumers in period 0 and paid for by distortionary taxation of
those consumers in period 1. In period 0, the government of each country i issues
to consumers claims to Bi units of currency payable in period 1. Let 1 + R denote
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in period 1, where we have used the normalization that p0 = 1 and p1 = π. Let kij
denote the amount that consumers save in the storage technology and dij, the amount
that they save by holding government debt. The budget constraints of consumer j in
country i are then
c0ij = ω − kij − dij
and




where we used the normalization that p0 = 1 and p1 = π.
We consider symmetric allocations across consumers in a given country so that,
for all j, dij = di,kij = ki,c0ij = c0i, and c1ij = c1i. In such symmetric allocation,
each consumer pays di = Bi/(1 + R) for claims to debt in period 0 and receives
a repayment (including interest) of Bi in period 1. We assume throughout that ω
is sufﬁciently small so that consumers choose to save. That is, we assume that the
equilibrium is interior, in the sense that both ki and di are positive. Let total debt
¯ d = (d1,...,dN) and total repayments made ¯ B = (B1,...,BN) summarize the debt
contracts.
The timing of this model without commitment is as follows. In period 0, the gov-
ernmentschoosetheirpromisedrepayments Bi.Consumersthenchoosehowmuchto
save in the storage technology kij and how much nominal debt to hold dij. In period
1,the monetary authority chooses the common inﬂation rate π as a function of the
promised nominal repayments ¯ B and the saved amounts ¯ k = (k1,...,kN). Finally,
the governments choose real tax revenues T i to satisfy their budget constraints.
To set up the equilibrium, we work back from the end of period 1. At that point,
given π and Bi, a government chooses to raise tax revenues to satisfy Ti = Bi/π.A t















+ (1 + r)ki
 
. (29)
In equation (29), we have integrated the consumers’ budget constraints in period 1,
used the government’s period 1 budget constraint to cancel terms, and then dropped
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where yπi and yTi denote the partial derivatives of y(π, Bi/π) with respect to the ﬁrst
and second arguments. Let π(¯ x, ¯ k) denote the resulting monetary policy rule.
Now consider the decisions of the consumers. These consumers have two ways to
save: by holding nominal debt and by using the storage technology. Clearly, in any
interior equilibrium, the real rates of return on government debt and storage must be
equal, so that




The ﬁrst-order condition relating marginal utilities in periods 0 and 1 is then given by
U (ci0) = β(1 + r)U (ci1) (31)
and is referred to as the ﬁrst-order condition for saving.
Finally, consider the decision of government i at the beginning of period 0. It is
convenient to formulate the government’s problem as a Ramsey problem in which
the government chooses both the debt and the decisions of consumers subject to the
consumers’ﬁrst-orderconditions.Inthenon-cooperativeequilibrium,thegovernment
of country i, taking other countries’ debt contracts and saving decisions as given,

















π( ¯ B, ¯ k),
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π( ¯ B, ¯ k)
 
+ (1 + r)ki
  (32)
subjecttotheﬁrst-orderconditionforconsumersavings(31),wherewehaveusedthe
budget constraints of the consumers and the government to substitute out variables.























π( ¯ B, ¯ k),
Bi
π( ¯ B, ¯ k)
 
+ (1 + r)ki
  
(33)
subject to the ﬁrst-order condition for consumer savings (31) in each country.
A non-cooperative equilibrium here is a monetary policy rule π( ¯ B, ¯ k) that solves
(29)andallocations( ¯ BN, ¯ kN)thatsolve(32).Acooperativeequilibriumisamonetary
policy rule π( ¯ B, ¯ k) that solves (29) and allocations ( ¯ BC, ¯ kC) that solve (33).
While this setup can be mapped into the language of the general theory section, for
convenience, we analyze the non-cooperative and cooperative equilibria directly. We
begin with a simple lemma that simpliﬁes this analysis.VARADARAJAN V. CHARI AND PATRICK J. KEHOE : 1347
LEMMA 1. In a symmetric non-cooperative equilibrium, the solution to the govern-
ment’s problem (32) coincides with the solution to a relaxed version of that problem
in which the ﬁrst-order condition for consumer savings in each country is dropped as
a constraint. A similar result holds for the symmetric cooperative equilibrium.
PROOF. To prove this lemma, we ﬁrst show that at any symmetric allocation in the
symmetric equilibrium,
∂π( ¯ B, ¯ k)
∂ki
= 0. (34)
We can compute this derivative by differentiating the monetary authority’s ﬁrst-order
condition (30), which deﬁnes π( ¯ B, ¯ k). This ﬁrst-order condition, with the optimal
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where c1i( ¯ B, ¯ k) is short-hand notation for the right side of (28) evaluated at π( ¯ B, ¯ k).
Taking the derivative of (35) and using the fact that at a symmetric allocation (30)
holds, we see that (35) reduces to
yπi −
Bi
π2 yTi = 0. (36)
As the optimal π does not vary with ki, equation (34) follows.
Nowconsidertheﬁrst-orderconditionforki inthelemma’srelaxedproblem.Using
equation (34), we know that this ﬁrst-order condition is simply
U (ci0) = β(1 + r)U (ci1). (37)
But this implies that the solution to the relaxed problem is also feasible for the
government’s original problem. Similar logic applies in the symmetric cooperative
equilibrium. 
From the lemma, (36), and the consumers’ﬁ rst-order condition (37), we know that
the ﬁrst-order condition for debt in the symmetric non-cooperative equilibrium can
be written as








while the ﬁrst-order condition for debt in the symmetric cooperative equilibrium is
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The ﬁrst-order condition for storage in both of these equilibria is simply (37).
The following proposition is then immediate:
PROPOSITION 4 (Free-riding in ﬁscal policies without commitment): A monetary union
with no commitment has a free-rider problem, in the sense that the non-cooperative
and cooperative equilibria differ, and the cooperative equilibrium has strictly higher
welfare than the non-cooperative equilibrium.
The free-rider problem can be eliminated by imposing constraints on the debt
policies of the union’s member governments. To see this, consider trying to support
the cooperative allocations as non-cooperative allocations subject to an upper limit
on debt repayments
Bi ≤ BC, (40)
where BC is deﬁned as the debt level in the cooperative equilibrium. We establish
our result by showing that under sufﬁcient conditions, the increment to welfare of
a marginal increase in debt is positive at the cooperative allocations. This result
implies that for a non-cooperative government, the debt constraint will bind at those
allocations. To see that, note that the left side of equation (38) is the increment to
welfareunderanon-cooperativegovernmentfromanincreaseindebt.Whenevaluated
at the cooperative allocations which satisfy equation (39), this increment equals








Letting η = (B/π)(∂π/∂B) denote the elasticity of nominal debt with respect to
inﬂation when evaluated at the cooperative equilibrium allocations, we have this
corollary.
COROLLARY TO PROPOSITION 4 (Debt constraints and the free-rider problem): In a
monetaryunionwithoutcommitment,if 0<η<1/N andeachgovernmentisrequired
to set its debt repayments Bi ≤ BC, given in equation (40), then the union has no
free-riderproblem,inthesensethatthenon-cooperativeequilibriumattainsthesame
levels as the cooperative equilibrium.
PROOF. We need to show that the increment to welfare in equation (41) is positive
when the elasticity satisﬁes 0 <η<1/N. To do so, rewrite equation (39) as
[V(g) − U (c0)](1 − Nη) + U (c0)yT = 0. (42)
As η<1/N, the term (1 − Nη) is positive. Because the term yT is negative, we know
that
V  (g) − U (c0) > 0,
which, since η>0, implies that equation (41) is positive. VARADARAJAN V. CHARI AND PATRICK J. KEHOE : 1349
It is easy to show that if y(π, T) is linear in its arguments, then η = 1/(2N), which
obviously satisﬁes the condition in the corollary 0 <η<1/N.
Thiscorollarycanbeinterpretedinanotherway.Considertheproblemofdesigning
the constraints on ﬁscal policy in the symmetric non-cooperative equilibrium in order
to reach the highest attainable level of welfare. Inspection of the cooperative problem
makesitclearthatthehighestattainablelevelofwelfareisthelevelinthecooperative
equilibrium. In the non-cooperative equilibrium, this welfare level can be reached by
setting the constraint Bi ≤ BC.
We now show that the analog of Proposition 2 applies to our ﬁscal policy appli-
cation. That is, when a monetary authority can commit, the cooperative and non-
cooperative equilibria coincide; hence, binding constraints on future debt issues can
only reduce welfare.
To show this, we make one change in the timing of the model to allow for com-
mitment by the monetary authority. Instead of waiting until period 1, the monetary
authority chooses the inﬂation rate π ﬁrst, at the start of period 0. Then the gov-
ernments choose their promised repayments Bi, and consumers choose how much to
storekijandhowmuchnominaldebttoholddij.Inperiod1,ﬁnally,thegovernments
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(43)
subject to the ﬁrst-order condition for consumer savings. The analogous problem in





























   (44)
subjectalsototheﬁrst-orderconditionforconsumersavings.Byinspection,weknow
that the solutions to these two problems are identical, and Proposition 2 holds, so that
in a monetary union with commitment, the non-cooperative and cooperative policies
coincide, and welfare in the resulting equilibria is the same. Thus, with commitment,
the union has no free-riding problem.
Propositions 2 and 4 imply that a time inconsistency problem in monetary policy is
attheheartofafree-riderprobleminﬁscalpolicy.Theyalsoimplythatthequestionof
whether debt constraints are desirable is intimately connected to the extent to which
the monetary authority can commit to monetary policy. From Proposition 4 and the
abovediscussion,weknowthatifsuchcommitmentisnotpossible,thenappropriately
chosen debt constraints raise welfare, whereas if such commitment is possible, then
debt constraints can only reduce it.1350 : MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING
The monetary union with commitment is broadly similar to the economies studied
in an extensive literature that has discussed the gains from international cooperation
in setting ﬁscal policy (see, e.g., the work of Chari and Kehoe 1990, Canzoneri and
Diba 1991). As noted in the introduction, this literature shows that the cooperation
is desirable if a country’s ﬁscal policy affects world real interest rates. In our ﬁscal
policy application, cooperation offers no gains under commitment because we have
effectively assumed that the monetary union is small in the world, in the sense that
the world interest rate is independent of the ﬁscal policy decisions of the union’s
members. We have done so by having a linear storage technology.
However, suppose that we consider instead a model in which the real interest rate
is affected by the decisions of the governments in the monetary union. In such a
formulation, even with commitment by the monetary authority, the non-cooperative
and cooperative equilibria do not coincide. This is because any country’s spending
decision affects the world interest rate and, hence, other countries’ welfare. As these
types of gains to cooperation are not especially related to the formation of a monetary
union, we abstract from them.
2.3 Bank Regulation
Now we apply our theory to a third type of non-monetary policy: bank regulation.
Here, the time inconsistency problem arises because the union’s monetary authority
cannot commit to not bailing out insolvent banks. Each country’s government policy
consists of determining the level of regulation of banks. Here, the free-rider problem
leads to lax regulation of banks, frequent bank bailouts, and a high rate of inﬂation.
The general argument in Propositions 1 and 2, that the time inconsistency problem
leadstoafree-riderproblem,applieshere,withthemodiﬁcationsdiscussedattheend
of the theory section. Here, we see that the unionwide restrictions on bank regulation
are desirable.
We assume that the private agents’ funds deposited in banks are fully insured,
banks have limited liability, and the monetary authority bails out insolvent banks
by printing money to pay off their depositors. Deposit insurance, together with
limited liability, creates an incentive for banks to take on excessive risk. We as-
sume that the governments regulate banks to limit risk-taking. In this application,
the free-rider problem leads governments to regulate too little and leads banks
to take on too much risk compared to how they would behave in the efﬁcient
allocation.
The environment here is as follows. The monetary union consists of N countries
indexedi=1,...,N.Theaggregatestateoftheunion’seconomyiss∈{H,L},where
H denotes a boom (or a high state) and L denotes a recession (or a low state). The
probabilities of H and L are µH and µL, respectively, where µH + µL = 1. Output is
produced as follows. Each country i has a large number of projects, indexed by zi ∈
[0, 1/2]. A project of type z yields a return R per unit of investment when it succeeds
and 0 otherwise. A project’s probability of success is pH(z) = (1/2) + z in a boom
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type of project—say, zi—will be chosen to be ﬁnanced by the country’s banks. The
total output in country i in state s ∈ {H, L} is ps(zi)R. Notice that when projects with
a higher value of z are chosen, the distribution of output is a mean-preserving spread
of the output when projects with a lower value of z are chosen.
This monetary union has many banks. Each bank can ﬁnance up to one unit of
investment.Abankincountryiobtainsfundsfromdepositorswhoarepaidaninterest
rate ri. Banks have limited liability, in that they must pay depositors only if bank
receipts exceed bank obligations. If bank receipts fall short of obligations, then banks
pay zero, and the monetary authority pays off the depositors by liquidating the bank’s
assetsandprintingmoneytocoveranyshortfall.Thegovernmentofcountryi=1,...,
N can do some costly supervision at a level of τi and prohibit banks from ﬁnancing
projects with z >τ i. This supervision of bank activities is what will represent bank
regulation in this economy.
We now describe optimal behavior by banks for a given inﬂation rate π and given
supervision levels ¯ τ = (τ1,...,τN). A bank’s maximization problem is to choose
which type of project to fund. A bank in country i, taking as given the interest rate
ri on its deposits and the government supervision level τi, chooses project type z to
maximize proﬁts:
qHi max{pH(z)R − ri,0}+qLi max{pL(z)R − ri,0} (45)
subject to z ≤ τi. Here, qHi and qLi are the prices in country i for one unit of
consumption in a boom and a recession (state H and L), respectively.
For some given policies π and ¯ τ and state prices qsi, for i = 1,..., N,s = H, L,
a competitive banking equilibrium consists of portfolio rules zi(τi) and deposit rates
ri(τi) such that (i) zi(τi) solves equation (45) given ri(τi) and (ii) proﬁts as deﬁned
in equation (45) are zero. Then we have the following:
LEMMA2. Inacompetitivebankingequilibrium, zi(τi)=τi andri = pH(zi(τi))R.
PROOF. Asproﬁtsarezeroinequilibrium,eachterminequation(45)iszero.Wedrop
the i subscript for simplicity. Because pH(z) ≥ pL(z), we know that r = pH(z)R
and pL(z)R − r ≤ 0. To see that the constraint z ≤ τ binds, suppose, by way of
contradiction, that it does not, that in equilibrium z <τ. Then, consider the problem
of an individual bank. For this bank, increasing z increases pH(z)R − r and, thus,
increases the ﬁrst term in equation (45). The second term is unchanged because
max {pL(z)R − ri,0 } is zero at the original value of z and increasing z lowers
pL(z)R −r; that is, the maximum value remains at zero. Thus, increasing z increases
proﬁts, which contradicts proﬁt maximization. 
We assume that the objective function for the private agents and the government
of country i is
 
s
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where ysi denotes output in country i and πs denotes the common inﬂation rate
across countries, both in state s. We assume that private agents cannot share risk
across countries, so that each agent simply consumes the output of country i. We also
assume that the utility function is increasing in output and decreasing in the inﬂation
rate. Output in each country i is given by the returns from the banks’ projects less
the costs of supervising banks, e(τi), which is increasing in τi. From the lemma, we
know that all banks in a given country choose projects of the same type zi,so that the
total output in country i is given by ys(zi, τi) = ps(zi)R − e(τi).
In this economy, the monetary authority is required to print money to bail out any
bank that cannot pay off its depositors, that is, when ri < ps(zi)R. A gross inﬂation
rate of π raises revenues of (π − 1)M, where M is the union’s initial money stock,
which we normalize to 1. Thus, the monetary authority must set π so that in each
state s
(πs(¯ r, ¯ z) − 1) M =
 
i
max{ri − ps(zi)R,0}, (47)
where ¯ r = (r1,...,rN) and ¯ z = (z1,...,zN).




A non-cooperative equilibrium here is given by a vector of bank supervision levels




µsU (ys(zi(¯ τ),τ i),π s(¯ r(¯ τ), ¯ z(¯ τ)))
along with a competitive banking equilibrium (¯ r(¯ τ), ¯ z(¯ τ)) and a monetary policy
function π that solves equation (47). A cooperative equilibrium is deﬁned similarly
exceptthatthevectorofsupervisionlevels ¯ τ maximizesthesumofobjectivefunctions
across countries.
The logic of the general setup discussed at the end of the theory section can be
appliedtothisbankregulationapplication.Toseehow,let xi bethevector(xir, xiz)=
(ri, zi) and π be the vector (π L, π H). To keep the notation simple, let the monetary
authority either bail out all insolvent banks, by setting πs = πs(¯ r, ¯ z), or not bail out
any insolvent bank, by setting πs = 0. Let the indicator variable d = 1 if there is a
bailout and d = 0 if not. As banks within each country all solve the same problem,
we need only consider a representative bank for each country. Hence, there is no zij




µsU (ys(zi,τ i),π s) if either ri ≤ ps(zi)R or d = 1,
andotherwise V(τi, xi,π)equalsanarbitrarilylargenegativenumber,say,−K.This
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in that country are solvent or there is a bailout. The payoff to the monetary authority
is then
 
i V(τi,xi,π). Because the cost of not bailing out insolvent banks is arbi-
trarily large, the optimal choice for the monetary authority is to bail out all insolvent
banks.
Now consider applying the extension of Proposition 1 that we referred to at the end
of the theory section. Government i’s ﬁrst-order condition under non-cooperation for






























This uses the feature that here neitherri nor zi varies with τj.A sVπ  = 0 and ∂ /∂τi
 = 0, policies under cooperation and non-cooperation differ. We have proven the
following proposition:
PROPOSITION 5 (Free-riding in bank regulation without commitment): Without com-
mitment, the monetary union has a free-riding problem, in the sense that the policies
under non-cooperation and cooperation differ.
The mechanism that leads to the free-rider problem here is as follows. When bank
supervision by a government slackens, banks under its supervision take on riskier
portfolios, and in a recession, the monetary authority must make larger bailouts.
These larger bailouts lead to higher inﬂation and lower welfare. In a non-cooperative
equilibrium,eachgovernmenttradesoffthegainsfromslackersupervisionagainstthe
costs it bears from higher inﬂation. In particular, each government ignores the costs
on others of the higher inﬂation that its actions induce. In a cooperative equilibrium,
the gains from slacker supervision are traded off against the costs that all bear from
higher inﬂation. These trade-offs lead to higher inﬂation and lower welfare in the
non-cooperative equilibrium.
Onewaytomitigatethefree-riderproblemwithregardtothistypeofnon-monetary
policy is to have countries set a mutually agreed upon level of bank supervision. Here
that level should be the cooperative level. Finally, Proposition 2 holds as stated for
this environment, so that when there is commitment by the monetary authority, there
is no free-rider problem.
3. CONCLUSION
We have shown that time inconsistency problems in monetary policy induce a
novel type of free-rider problem in non-monetary policies within monetary unions.1354 : MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING
The source of the free-rider problem is the behavior of private agents. We have
demonstrated that the free-rider problem can be solved, or at least mitigated, by
setting constraints on non-monetary policies. When a union’s monetary authority
cannot commit to its policies, such constraints lead to better monetary as well as non-
monetarypolicies.Withcommitment,however,non-monetarypolicyconstraintsonly
impose costs.
Here, we have also illustrated our theory by applying it to three common types of
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